Recruitment of spies

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HUMINT secret asset recruitment refers to the recruitment of human agents, commonly known as spies, working for foreign governments, within host governments, or other targets of intelligence interest for human intelligence gathering. The method of detecting and "multiplying" the spies that betray their oaths to work on behalf of a foreign intelligence agency is called counter intelligence.

The term spies refers to human agents recruited by case officers from foreign intelligence agencies.

Video Recruitment of spies

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Obtaining information may not involve the collection of confidential documents, but something as simple as observing the number and types of ships in ports. Although such information may be visible, laws in many countries will consider reporting it to foreign power espionage. Other asset roles include support functions such as communication, forgery, disguise, etc.

According to Victor Suvorov, a former Soviet military intelligence officer, his services have Soviet officers, under diplomatic or non-official cover, dealing with two types of agents: basic and additional.

Basic agents can be formed into groups with leaders, or report directly to the controller. Basic agents include information providers, possibly through espionage or expertise about some local subject. Also in the base group are "executive agents", who will kill or sabotage, and recruit agents. In US practice, recruitment agencies are called access agents.

Both the operations leaders and the additional groups should be tacit in supporting roles for basic agents. They may be clandestine FIS officers, such as Rudolf Abel, recruited in a target country, or recruited in a third country. One additional function is communication, which includes secret radio transmissions, drops, couriers, and finding a place for secure radio transmissions. Other additional functions include people who can "legalize" agents with side jobs, and specialists who can falsify documents or obtain forbidden copies from actual sources. A safe home, secure mail, and a secure phone are other additional functions.

Maps Recruitment of spies

Spotting

The recruitment process usually begins with "spotting". Spotting is the identification of targets - people - who seem to have access to information, or are appealing to some supporting roles. These individuals can be "developed" over a period of time before an approach is made or can be made "cold". Alternatively, potential agents may approach the agency; many intelligence assets are not recruited but "walk-in" or "write-ins" that offer information to foreign intelligence services. Background research is conducted on potential agents to identify any relationship with foreign intelligence agents, select the most promising candidate and method of approach.

Clear candidates are staff of staff under diplomatic protection, or officers under non-official contact, have regular contact. Also possible contacts of an access agent, existing agent, or through information indicating they may be compromised.

Targeted monitoring (eg, military or other companies, open source or compromised reference documents) sometimes reveals people with potential access to information, but there is no clear way to approach them. With this group, a secondary survey should be conducted. Headquarters may be able to suggest an approach, perhaps through a third country or through resources unknown to the field station.

Recruiting people who may have access to the activities of non-state groups will be much more difficult, since these groups tend to be much more stealthy, and often operate on a cell system of relatives and people who have know each other for years. An access agent may be very important here, and may be worth the effort to find a potential access agent.

The deliberate spotting process complements a clearer candidate, but candidates are also more likely to be compromised by counterintelligence, such as walk-in and write-ins.

According to Suvorov, Soviet GRUs are not always able to gather enough material, especially from open sources, to understand candidate's motivation and vulnerability. It is the GRU doctrine, therefore, to use every meeting to keep digging this information. Other intelligence authorities also see information as an ongoing process.

That follow-up meetings either provide substantive intelligence, as well as knowledge of assets, not conflict with security. The handler agent still observes all the clandestine rules when developing agency relations. Knowledge of meetings, and indeed knowledge of the existence of assets, must be based on the strict need to know.

People with access to technology

After the election of the recruitment candidate, the first step, search and coaching, begins. Details are collected on candidates, details that can be obtained through references, books, phone directories, press, and other recruited agents. A further definition of the motive to be used in the actual recruitment of the person is cultivated and the disadvantages worsened.

People with access to knowledgeable people

Especially when the case officer is a different culture than the one he or she targets, the recruitment process begins not necessarily with the person having the desired information. Instead, the first recruit may be someone who is well connected in the local culture. Such a person can be called a main agent or an access agent who may only set up an introduction, or actually run a sub-agent operation. Some of these types of agents may be able to assist in the pre-assessment and development recruitment stages, or may only be involved in finding possible assets.

Indeed, an access agent can manage the introduction without actually being aware that the goal's goal is to find people who will participate in espionage. A respected technical professional, or a professor, will often make an introduction in their field. Such recognition makes perfect sense in the context of non-espionage, such as finding a job or people to fill it. The process of recruiting personnel for industry is not entirely different from recruiting spies. Both can use private networks, and, in industrialized countries, computer-aided "private" networks (for example, via websites such as LinkedIn).

People in the allied intelligence services

A professional intelligence officer may be able to obtain contact through partners in the intelligence services of allied countries. Other services may set up direct contact and then exit the process, or may jointly operate assets such as the US-UK joint operation with Oleg Penkovsky. The allied officer may not actually grant access to its assets, but will deliver requests for information and responses. There is an example of a CIA studying from a Malaysian service about al Qaeda meetings in Kuala Lumpur, something that a CIA case officer alone can not do.

Target employees based on intelligence information

HUMINT collectors should not forget that analysts in their own organizations can have a sophisticated understanding of people, with special knowledge, in target countries, industries, or other groups. The analyst may or may not know the details of the target personality.

Even when no personal details are available, the recruiter, in the intelligence service, may have additional resources to use before the first contact. OSINT's research can find publications of professional interest, but also social. Taking into account the risks and resources required, SIGINT can tap into phone lines or intercept other communications that will provide more information to recruiters about targets.

Prioritizing potential recruitment

This step is different from the next, the assessment of potential recruits, in this case not focused on self-recruiting, the possibility of recruitment, etc., but, when there is more than one possibility of recruiting, and a limited number of case officers, the discussion here provides the criteria for choosing the most important targets.

One analysis by the US black service officer with knowledge of European practices had five priorities that decreased in the period between 1957 and 1962. He developed this in a context placed in Europe during the Cold War, with the aim of obtaining HUMINT recruitment in the Soviet Union and other countries, satellite state. The operation is focused on people with general characteristics:

• They are embroiled in embassies, legations, consulates, trade missions, and news agencies that make up "is a tool for economic penetration, political subversion, and espionage that threatens US interests." That focus can be considered as one of the counter-intelligence and also espionage.
• They are outside their "iron curtain for a long time, two to five years," so recruitment can involve a variety of United States intelligence resources, and may be allied.

Among these groups, the priorities are:

1. The most valuable recruits have regular access to "current political and economic intelligence of the intended installations". Ideally, the asset will be in the country of the highest priority and has access to the "minutes of the Politburo meeting" or military, scientific or other equally important data in the case of a country dominating the country (eg, satellites from former Soviet states) or a client country of another power, a client country official, or a patron's state representative on a client, may be easier to recruit than an official in the home country.
2. Almost as important is the agent who will continue the relationship once he returns to his home country, be it the Soviet Union or the satellite. Recruitment is more difficult to detect with lower counterintelligence surveillance than independent states or satellites. "Penetration mounting thus becomes a means to build long-term assets in Satellites by recruiting, testing, and training them when they are abroad." In other words, the priority is to recruit a defector in place, keep reporting. "Satellite diplomats, foreign trade officials, journalists, or intelligence officers who have been useful to us abroad will be more valuable when he returns home at the end of his journey, not only because he is within the target country, but because of his intelligence have access to the ministry's headquarters with greater scope and depth.
3. The third priority involves offensive counter-extracting: by observing the intelligence activities operated from the state embassy of X, the counter-intelligence service can deduce the characteristics of hiring and agent-handling practices for country X. Because these officers and techniques affect many of the enemy's targets in (FIS) may be neutralized in various ways, including police actions, assuring assets in the operating country to stop working with FIS, or ideally, "Recruit hostile intelligence officers in place".
4. The fourth and fifth priorities are far less urgent than the first three. The fourth priority is "senior diplomatic personnel defection, commerce, or intelligence." Defections can obviously produce only existing gold eggs in the nest, cutting off the sustainable intelligence that can be provided by assets in place It may be valuable, however, to simply refuse the target service country a capable and experienced officer, and may produce, in addition to his shop of positive intelligence, leading to his former comrades who are still in place. "
5. The last priority is not direct recruitment, but the collection of information to support future recruitment. This begins with obtaining biographical information about "overseas officials who may in the future have another foreign duty tour somewhere in the world.An official may not be able to be developed for recruitment during his current tour, but six months from now may be the story different, political turmoil into what is inside the satellite, "ins" can quickly become "outsiders". If we can identify someone as a former "in" who is now "out" we may be able to recruit him But identification of this type requires an index regular and up-to-date biographies of Satellite personnel traveling overseas ".

Assess potential candidates

In deciding whether to recruit potential customers, there needs to be a process to ensure that the person is not actively working for counter-intelligence, being supervised by them, or presenting other risks that may not make the recruitment wise. The assessment process applies both to walk-ins and recruitment targets, but additional assessments need to be applied to walk-in, which is likely to be someone sent by a counter-intelligence service.

Assess walk-ins

The main intelligence services are very cautious about walk-ins or write-ins, but some of the most important assets to know are walk-ins, such as Oleg Penkovsky or writers (using intelligence trading) like Robert Hanssen. Most walk-ins are rejected.

The US Army sets three classes of people who may present themselves:

1. Defect
2. Asylum seeker
3. Walk-ins: trying to provide information to the United States; or dissatisfied person (dissatisfied and irritated person, especially against authority) who surrenders himself to a US installation in a foreign country and who appears willing to accept on-site recruitment or request asylum or assistance to escape the control of his government.

The Soviet response, to someone who visited the embassy, ​​was "This is a diplomatic representative and not an espionage center." Be very good to leave the building or we will call the police ". According to Suvorov, police are usually not summoned but embassy staff chase prospective agents quickly.

Careful handling of walk-ins is not exclusively a Soviet concern. The US Army Procedure is to have military intelligence (MI) or military police (MP) personnel who handle all walk-ins aspects. Under the US Army Rules, military police are not meant to interrogate, which is the responsibility of military intelligence personnel.

While serious discussions with contacts will be made by counter-intelligence specialists, information on walk-ins should be limited to people with "need to know." "The information provided by walk-ins must be kept and classified appropriately".

While the interviewers are actually from MI, walk-ins will never be notified of the identity of intelligence personnel. If they ask to see an intelligence representative, they will be told that nothing is available. Both of these measures are intended to prevent hostile intelligence services from learning about the structure or procedures of US intelligence/counter intelligence personnel.

The Soviets showed the same caution as the United States. The Soviet Soviet doctrine is that in general, walk-ins are only considered when they can show some evidence of access to valuable material. The best way to do this is by bringing an example of information. Suvorov observes that "this may be the only way to convince the GRU that they can trust that person".

Suvorov describes an ideal; the one-time head of the GRU, General Ivan Serov, is willing to explore potential agents who provide reasonable information about themselves and their access, or "write-in" whose potential can be verified before the meeting.

General ratings

It has been the common experience of potentially recruited intelligence agencies, recruited early in the development process, and those currently reporting to local case officers still need to be checked against the parent archives and other files, which will help find foreign counters. This counter-intelligence interest can come from their own country or third.

Once a person is seen to have potential access to information, the recruiting officer or staff consider why a loyal and trusted person may wish to betray his or her own party. One basic reason is the classic MICE motivation, with further insight into the attitude that predisposes to cooperation.

Headquarters may have access to information that field offices do not have, such as being able to access credit records to identify financial pressures, through snippets that hide the request as it comes from state service B. Another area where headquarters can help is linking possible penetration efforts done by someone who approaches his or her own intelligence service, or aligns, at different locations, such as, for example, embassies in different cities.

There is a local and headquarters-based validation tool. The case officer should compare the information, provided by the agent, with facts known locally, both from open and hidden sources. Some services, particularly Russia/Soviet, may not have formal or extensive OSINT, and case officers may need to check such matters (or arrange checkable requests) within the station/residence.

Some definite warnings, which may come from local reporting or headquarters, include:

• Agent information conflicts with other information believed to be true
• The agent information has appeared in the local open source
• The information is correct, but too old to be operational. This is one of the key techniques of the Double Cross World War II System
• If there are inconsistencies in an agent's life story, which the case officer can periodically address through social conversation, the truth is usually in a consistent aspect. It is easier to make mistakes in keeping lies, than to tell the truth, which is why criminal investigators ask suspects to repeat their statements.
• If the agent makes a prediction, be sure to see if it's correct
• If the hiring service personnel use technical means to detect avoidance, such as polygraphy, sound voltage analysis, psychologist and psychiatric interviews, and possibly more in the future, brain imaging, take advantage of this in agency policies. Know that penetrators can be trained to resist.

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Access agents and access techniques

The access agent does not have significant access to intelligence value material, but has contact with those who do so. Such a person can be as simple as a barber outside a military base, or as complex as a think tank or academic expert (ie, outside the government) who regularly deals with government personnel who have access to sensitive material.

In private and public organizations dealing with sensitive material, human resources workers, receptionists, and other seemingly low-level personnel know a great deal about people with sensitive access. Certain employees, such as carers and janitors, who have no formal access, can still gain access to safe rooms and containers; there is an opaque area between an access agent that might let your collector to an area, and a supportive employee who may gather information that he or she may or may not understand.

Love, honeypots, and recruitment

US intelligence agencies, for example, are concerned when their own personnel can be subject to sexual exploitation. This applied to any homosexual relationship until the mid-1990s, and also applied to heterosexual relationships with most foreign nationals. See honeypots in espionage fiction for fictitious examples. In some cases, especially when a citizen is a friendly citizen, the relationship needs to be reported. Failure to do so, even with a friendly nation, may result in dismissal.

A former CIA officer said that although sexual traps are generally not a good tool for recruiting a foreign official, it is sometimes successfully employed to solve short-term problems. Flirt is a classical technique; "swallow" is a KGB tradition term for women, and the term "crow" for men, trained to woo intelligence targets.

During the Cold War, the KGB (and allied services, including the East German Stasi under Mark Wolf, and the Cuban Intelligence Directorate [formerly known as DirecciÃÆ'³n General de Inteligencia or DGI]) often attempted to trap CIA officers. The KGB believes that Americans are sex-obsessed materialists, and that US spies can be easily trapped by sexual lures. However, the most notable incident is Clayton Lonetree, a marine guard watchdog at the Moscow embassy, ​​who is tempted by "swallow" who is a translator at the US Embassy in Moscow. Once seduction happens, he connects it with a KGB handler. The espionage continued after his transfer to Vienna, though he eventually surrendered.

The Soviets use sex not only for direct recruitment, but as the possibility that an American officer may need to be compromised in the future. The CIA itself limits the use of sexual recruitment of foreign intelligence services. "Coercive recruitment is generally unsuccessful, we find that money supply and freedom work better". If the Agency finds a Soviet intelligence officer having a boyfriend, they will try to recruit his girlfriend as an access agent. After CIA personnel had access to Soviet officers, they might try to double it.

Examples of people trapped in a sexual way include:

• Samson, a Bible judge about the Israelites, whose lover Delilah learns the secret of his superhuman strength and uses it to betray him to the Philistines.
• Mordechai Vanunu, an Israeli nuclear whistleblower.
• Clayton J. Lonetree, a US embassy guard in Moscow, was framed by a female Soviet officer in 1987. He was later blackmailed to submit documents when he was assigned to Vienna. Lonetree was the first US Marines to be punished for spying on the United States.
• Irvin C. Scarbeck, a US diplomat, was framed by Polish female officers in 1961 and photographed in a compromised position. He is blackmailed to give secrets.
• Sharon Scranage, a CIA employee described as "naive and naive village girl", allegedly teased by Ghana intelligence agent Michael Soussoudis. He then gave him information about CIA operations in Ghana, which were then distributed with the Soviet bloc countries.
• John Vassall, a British embassy official in Moscow, who was guided by the KGB to have sex with many male partners while intoxicated in 1954. The KGB then used photographs of this incident to blackmail Vassall in order to provide them with confidential information.
• Bernard Boursicot, a French diplomat, is trapped by Shi Pei Pu, who works for the Chinese government. Shi Pei Pu, a male Chinese opera singer, successfully disguised as a woman and told Boursicot that she was carrying a Boursicot boy. The situation was fictional into the drama of M. Butterfly.
Sir Geoffrey Harrison, British Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was recalled to London in 1968 after he confessed to the Foreign Office that he had an affair with a Russian leaflet at the embassy, ​​where he had been shown to be compromised. photo by KGB.
• Katrina Leung, indicted as a double agent who works for China and the FBI, wooed her FBI administrator James J. Smith and was able to obtain FBI information about usage to China through her. He also had an affair with another FBI officer, William Cleveland.
• In 2006, AttachÃÆ'Â Â © British Defense in Islamabad Pakistan, was called home, when it was known that he had been involved in a relationship with a Pakistani woman, who was an intelligence agent. While the British Government denies that the secret is missing, other sources say that some of the operations and operations of the West in Pakistan are compromised.
• In May 2007 a female officer in charge of Swedish Kosovo forces allegedly leaked confidential information to her Serbian lover who turned out to be a spy.
• Won Jeong-hwa, who was captured by South Korea in 2008 and accused of spying for North Korea, is accused of using this method to obtain information from an army officer.

Spotting through emotional attachment

Other factors may apply. True friendship or romance can attract other people to engage with the current agent. John Anthony Walker, who spies on money, recruits friends and relatives. Rosario Ames, wife of Aldrich Ames, was taken to her husband's activities.

Katrina Leung is one of the more complex cases, coming to the United States with a Taiwan passport, engaging with Chinese activists, who recruited her to report to the FBI. He seduced his FBI case officers, and was eventually recruited by the FBI as "dangling" to the PRC's targets, especially in the China State Security Ministry (MSS). His first report was independently confirmed by the CIA. Later, however, he was found to be passing the FBI document to the MSS, while still reporting to the FBI. When he was allowed, initially, to continue, believing that the information he gave to the United States was more important than what he gave to the PRC, he was eventually arrested and charged with a relatively low crime. Finally, it was rejected for reasons of the prosecutor's offense, although subsequent appeals by the US government resulted in a bargain. Her true loyalty was never published, but, at different times, she appeared to have doubled cascated and agent , and possibly a PRC access agent to FBI personnel.

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Development

The development, preparation for actual recruitment, involves a direct approach by case officers who have some access to potential recruitment, indirect approach through an access or ownership agency, or have a reason to risk a "cold" approach. Before direct hiring, there may be a complex development period .

The case officer, possibly through an access agent, works for a relationship. This phase, in which the potential agent is called developmental , has not reached the recruitment pitch. After the cultivation stage, open contact is formed with a candidate under the guise of an official meeting. Once the acquaintance has matured and the official meeting progresses into a private meeting, the stage of development begins.

Choosing between "collisions" and phased approach

Suvorov describes the "accident approach" as the most demanding form of recruitment, which must be done only if the local rezident, or head of the GRU unit, convinces the GRU headquarters that the risk is valuable. "Quite a few examples are known about recruitment at the first meeting, of course after secret cultivation that has been going on for months".

"The accident approach, or 'love at first glance' in the GRU jargon, has some undeniable advantages.Contact with the future agent only happens once, not for months of meetings, as is the phased approach After the first contact of the agent the new recruits themselves will take action on his own security He will never talk to his wife, or tell him that he has an interesting friend in the Soviet military attache who is also very interested in collecting stamps.

Compromise during development

Telling someone's wife or colleague about a charming Soviet friend can jeopardize the whole development. The United States was also aware that the process of Soviet development, preferably, gradually. "The developmental stage brings together the relationship and encourages loyalty to it.A hostile intelligence officer may then, through friendly persuasion, ask for the innocent and unimportant support of the candidate and pay him generously for it, thus placing the candidate in a position of Obligation During this stage the agent the future becomes accustomed to being asked for help and fulfilling them accurately The ambitions of future agents, financial and work matters, hobbies, etc., continue to be assessed by intelligence teams to exacerbate weaknesses Professional future agents, social personalities and personalities are immediately disarmed.

This is the goal of the case officer, with the appropriate support of his organization, to study vulnerability, build trust, and solve problems for its development. These are all preparatory steps to ask, perhaps subtly, the development to betray his own party.

Information requests begin innocently, usually requesting public information, but to gain development on the road to treason. At first, every request for a document is for open documents, which case officers give some reason for not getting it. A creative duty officer can then request a technically restricted document, but it's still quite innocent, like an unclassified phone directory.

Interactions become more sensitive, especially when the case officer asks for something that is technically classified, but with explanations that allow potential recruitment to rationalize that he or she is not actually betraying any beliefs. During this time, case officers are building psychological controls. In some cases, it is possible to get useful information without ever asking for development to betray his country. These cases may mean the role of recruiter is not to be a direct agent, but may be as an access or a support agent. Recruitment may not even be aware of its relationship with FIS.

Finally, relationships will move from clandestine to open, when foreign services have significant compromise information on assets. If the asset is motivated by money, he will find the task assigned to him may be more challenging, but his payment is reduced, since he is no longer in a position to negotiate.

Recruitment through professional interests

The traditional openness of the scientific community can be used to gain information from an individual with access to valuable commercial, scientific or military material. "There are other important sources, unique to scientific intelligence.This is a specialized expertise in the field of science available in the country itself for consultation, natural phenomena free from political boundaries, and experts in positions of agents, observe this phenomenon as far as they cast light on the feasibility of developing a suspected enemy. "

The 1998 document describes the typical foreign intelligence recruitment of citizens with access to sensitive technology. "Hostile intelligence services begin the agency recruitment process by carefully gathering information on industry-linked people, RDT & amp; E laboratories, government agency staff, military bases, and design organizations." A recruitment candidate usually meets the following criteria:

• They must be in a position to provide real-life information to a hostile intelligence service, either to steal or copy S & P information; to communicate confidential information by word of mouth, or to recruit new agents./li>
• There must be a motive in the way that a person can be recruited:
  • Financial considerations/greed (beyond all other motives)
  • Revenge/dissatisfaction
  • The extortion/hostage situation (used in the Soviet Union but very rare in the United States)
  • Attract national emigre pride
  • Exploit emotional engagement
  • False flag approach
  • Exploit naivetÃÆ' Â ©
  America
  • Gender
  • Ideology (which was no longer motivated during the Cold War, the Soviet service changed its emphasis to concentrate on sympathy for the "persecuted" elements of American society, or other target societies)

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Recruitment

If a decision is made for formal recruitment, case officers are well-developed to meet in more ambiguous and more unusual places. This can have countersurveillance functions, in which additional officers can supervise meetings, and travel there, for evidence of "A country" counter-intelligence interests. Without a fully realized development, he is drawn into an increasingly treacherous activity, which will be more difficult and more difficult to explain when he is caught. It is considered important for case officers to offer money, may be dismissed as covering costs, but really as a means to compromise progress.

Finally, especially if the recruitment is ideologically sympathetic to Country B, the case officer makes a direct field of recruitment. This may not work, and, in fact, can generate anger. The case officer must be ready for physical defense and escape if this becomes necessary. If case officers can produce compromised photographs, receipts, etc., even subjects that initially ideologically are now moving into the world of compromise.

Recruiting through business relationships

As part of technical intelligence gathering, the main business personnel, or even the business itself, can be recruited. Both KGB and GRU use this route. The KGB service for this is Line X, which is reported to the T Directorate of the Main Directorate of KGB. GRU runs recruitment at industry trade fairs. Suvorov explained that recruitment is very effective with small companies: "The owner of a small company, even a very successful one, is always at great risk, always wanting to strengthen the situation... In any case, if he sells his product he can hide the facts from the authorities. to hide the money it has received ". However, the entrepreneur may forget that while he may not report cash transactions to his own government, the GRU must have recorded payment actions, and may use them for the next extortion.

Suvorov explains that while the most strategic information seems to be linked to large companies, there are several reasons why the approach to smaller companies is the place to start.

• In many products, the real breakthrough is not the whole plane or tank, but some subcomponents.

1. People recruited at a small company can become an access agent for hiring in large companies.

Legalizing an illegal agent

Although the usual practice is to recruit targeted citizens, there are cases where FIS brings illegal agents to the country. A common practice is to include them through a third country, and perhaps claim to be immigrants from a fourth country.

The "illegal" introduction may be due to the need to bring specialists to carry out some parts of the operation. The Soviet KGB has a Department V, which is managed with qualified officers to kill or sabotage.

FIS specialists may also require legalization to conduct secret intelligence gathering. The United States has had a group of CIA and NSA specialists who will place technical sensors, ranging from tap the phone to a special device to measure weapon tests, to the target country.

Obtaining documentation and other resources is the role of agents and documentation of legalization. Candidates for this category of agents are sought among police officers and passport departments, consular employees, customs and immigration officers, and small employer employers. Legal agents are subject to a very thorough examination, because illegal fates are entrusted to them. When an illegal Soviet Union arrives in a country, the task of the legalizing agency is to ascertain the issue of the document by making the necessary entry in the registration books and to ensure that the illegal possesses the necessary documentation.

A common technique is to find a birth note of someone known to die. The "documentation agent" who does this will not be illegal.

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See also

• Useful Idiot

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References

Source of the article : Wikipedia